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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
On appeal, Ms. Youmans asserted: (1) the district court abused its discretion by
admitting the testimony of Officer Kip Paporello regarding the identification of the pills
found on Ms. Youmans, due to the State’s failure to lay a proper foundation for the
testimony; (2) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Youmans
possessed a controlled substance without a valid prescription; (3) the district court
abused its discretion by imposing unified sentences of ten years with three years fixed
and five years, with three years fixed, upon Ms. Youmans, for her convictions for
burglary and attempted burglary; and (4) the district court was without jurisdiction to
make any factual findings related to the prosecutorial misconduct1 alleged in the Notice
of Appeal after Ms. Youmans timely appealed to this Court. Both the Ada County
Prosecutor’s Office (“County”) and the Attorney General’s Office (“AG”) filed briefs in
response.2

In footnote 6, the County infers the presence of evil intent upon Ms. Youmans based
upon her use of the term “prosecutorial misconduct” in the Appellant’s Brief. To
undersigned counsel’s knowledge, “prosecutorial misconduct’ is a term of art universally
used by the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Idaho
Supreme Court, and the Idaho Court of Appeals. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004);
United States v. Alcantara-Castillo, 788 P.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2015); State v. Langford,
2016 Opinion No. 82 (2016); State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445 (2012); and State v.
Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635 (Ct. App. 2011). In fact, as recently as July 22, 2016, in
Lankford, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court used the term “prosecutorial misconduct” 19
times in a case where the Idaho Supreme Court reversed a first degree murder
conviction based upon a prosecutor withholding certain evidence. A claim that the
prosecuting attorney improperly withheld and failed to disclose pertinent evidence to the
defense is a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. See Lankford, supra.
2 Because the County and the AG disagree about whether the district court had
jurisdiction to make additional findings of fact after the filing of a Notice of Appeal,
Ms. Youmans will refer to them as separate parties in her Appellant’s Reply Brief, rather
than as just “the State.”
1

1

This Reply Brief is necessary to address the County’s argument on appeal that
Ms. Youmans’ claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear additional evidence
and make new factual findings related to a pretrial issue following the timely filing of a
notice of appeal, is moot and an improper attempt to seek an advisory opinion.
Ms. Youmans’ claim that the district court was without jurisdiction is not moot as the
requested relief, that offered evidence and findings be stricken from the record, is
available to the district court regardless of whether an issue was raised on appeal
regarding the allegation of prosecutorial misconduct. Even if the mootness doctrine is
applicable, because Ms. Youmans has the possibility of suffering collateral legal
consequences, this Court should address the merits of her claim. Finally, the AG is
correct that the district court was without jurisdiction to make any factual findings
alleged in the Amended Notice of Appeal after Ms. Youmans timely appealed to this
Court.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Youmans’ Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES3
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony of Officer Kip
Paporello regarding the identification of the pills found on Ms. Youmans, due to
the State’s failure to lay proper foundation for the testimony?

2.

Was there insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Ms. Youmans possessed a controlled substance without a valid prescription?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing unified sentences of ten
years, with three years fixed and five years, with two years fixed fixed, upon
Ms. Youmans’ convictions for burglary and attempted burglary, to be served
concurrently, in light of the mitigating factors present in the case?

4.

Was the district court without jurisdiction to make any factual findings related to
the prosecutorial misconduct alleged in the Notice of Appeal, after Ms. Youmans
timely appealed to this Court?

Ms. Youmans’ Appellant’s Reply Brief will only address the County’s argument that her
jurisdictional claim is moot and that district court had jurisdiction to entertain the State’s
Motion to Supplement the Record as the remaining arguments by the AG are
unremarkable.

3

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Make Any Factual Findings Related To
The Prosecutorial Misconduct Alleged In The Notice Of Appeal After Ms. Youmans
Timely Appealed To This Court

A.

Ms. Youmans’ Jurisdictional Argument Is Not Moot
On appeal, while the AG agrees the district court was without jurisdiction, both

the County and the AG argue the issue raised by Ms. Youmans is moot because
Ms. Youmans did not raise a claim on appeal that the prosecutor committed misconduct
by withholding evidence from the defense. (AG Respondent’s Brief, pp.14-15; County
Respondent’s Brief, pp.10-11.) Specifically, the AG asserts because the “allegation that
the prosecutor withheld evidence” was not raised on appeal, then a “determination of
whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider the additional evidence offered by
the prosecutor below . . . will have no practical effect upon the outcome of the case.”
(AG Respondent’s Brief, p.15.) Likewise, the County argues, “by electing not to pursue
her evidence-withholding issues, she mooted this issue because there is no longer a
substantive underlying appellate issue for the parties to brief and argue.”

(County

Respondent’s Brief, p.10.) Both parties assert that Ms. Youmans is merely seeking an
advisory option. (AG Respondent’s Brief, p.20; County Respondent’s Brief, p.4.) The
AG and County are incorrect
Mootness precludes appellate review on an issue that presents no justiciable
controversy and where a judicial determination would have no practical effect on the
outcome. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128
Idaho 276, 281 (1996); Storm v. Spaulding, 137 Idaho 145, 148 (Ct. App. 2002). A party
4

lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome when even a favorable judicial
decision would not result in relief. Freeman v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 138 Idaho 872, 875
(Ct. App. 2003). Whether a case should be dismissed for mootness is a question of
law, subject to free review. Storm, 137 Idaho at 148.
Here, both the AG and the County fail to recognize the relief Ms. Youmans is
seeking, with regard to her claim the district court did not have jurisdiction to
supplement the record, is that all evidence offered after Ms. Youmans filed a timely
Notice of Appeal should be removed from the record. (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.21-22.)
Thus, Ms. Youmans has a legally cognizable interest in a favorable decision because if
this Court agrees the district court was without jurisdiction, the remedy would be to
strike all evidence offered and findings of fact made after the filing of the Notice of
Appeal. In other words, a favorable decision would result Ms. Youmans obtaining the
relief she requested.
Moreover, the instant appeal likely represents the only opportunity for
Ms. Youmans to address the improperly offered and accepted evidence. When the
county prosecutor offered the evidence, Ms. Youmans objected. (7/7/15 Tr., p.4, Ls.210, p.5, Ls.4-8; R., pp.315-319.) Thus, the issue is preserved for review by this Court,
as Ms. Youmans’ timely entered an objection to the introduction of the challenged
evidence. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). If Ms. Youmans failed to
raise her claim on direct appeal, it will be deemed to have been waived for purposes of
post-conviction relief. See Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 462 (Ct. App. 2009). Thus,
the instant direct appeal is Ms. Youmans’ last opportunity to remedy the improper
augmentation of new evidence and facts into the appellate record.
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Finally, if this Court does not strike the improper evidence as a remedy in this
appeal, it will be before the district court and properly considered in the event
Ms. Youmans needs to, and is ultimately required to file a petition for post-conviction
relief to seek additional relief not obtained on direct appeal. Accordingly, in light of the
foregoing, the mootness document is inapplicable to the circumstances presented in the
instant case.
B.

Assuming Arguendo, That This Court Determines The Mootness Doctrine
Applies, Because There Is The Possibility Of Collateral Legal Consequences,
This Court Should Address The Merits Of Ms. Youmans’ Jurisdictional Claim
Even where a question is moot, there are three exceptions to the mootness

doctrine: (1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on
the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial
review and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises
concerns of substantial public interest. State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8 (2010).
Here, if this Court determines the mootness doctrine is applicable because she
failed to argue the alleged prosecutorial misconduct issue, Ms. Youmans has the
possibility of suffering collateral legal consequences. Without a legal determination as
to whether the district court had jurisdiction to conduct an evidentiary hearing related to
the alleged prosecutor misconduct, the evidence offered and findings entered, will
remain in the district court record. Thus, if Ms. Youmans attempts to raise a claim that
her trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to properly allege
and litigate the prosecutorial misconduct claim, Ms. Youmans will most likely be
foreclosed because the district court will have already made factual findings based upon
evidence offered by the prosecutor. If the evidence offered and findings of fact entered
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regarding the claim of prosecutorial misconduct for allegedly withholding evidence are
allowed to remain in the record, Ms. Youmans will have suffered collateral legal
consequences with no available relief.
Accordingly, because the district court was without jurisdiction to consider
additional evidence and supplement the record this case, this Court should remove from
the record all of the State’s legal filings related to this issue from the date of
Ms. Youmans’ December 15, 2014 Notice of Appeal and all evidence offered and
findings made by the district court should be stricken and not considered by any court in
any future proceedings related to this case.
C.

The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Make Any Factual Findings
Related To The Prosecutorial Misconduct Alleged In The Notice Of Appeal After
Ms. Youmans Timely Appealed To This Court
As to the merits of Ms. Youmans’ claim that the district court was without

jurisdiction to hear additional evidence and make any factual findings after she timely
filed a Notice of Appeal, the AG concedes that “the district court was without jurisdiction
to consider the additional evidence. Generally, once a notice of appeal has been filed,
the district court lacks jurisdiction to take any action in a case except as permitted by
Idaho Appellate Rule 13.” (AG Respondent’s Brief, p.15, citing State v. Lemmons, 158
Idaho 971 (2015).) The County, on the other hand, argues that “the district court had
jurisdiction to consider the additional discovery matters.” (County Respondent’s Brief,
p.13.)
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1.

The County Prosecutor Does Not Have A Due Process Right To
Supplement The Record In The District Court Following A Timely Filing Of
A Notice Of Appeal

The County relies first upon the general notion of due process.

(County

Respondent’s Brief, pp.13-4 (citing Cleveland Bd. Of Educ.v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
542 (1985).) Specifically, the County asserts,
When a charge of misconduct is made against a prosecutor it carries a
very real threat to that prosecutor’s license and continued employment.
Given the potential and severe repercussions that may be visited upon the
prosecutor charged with the violations, he or she is entitled to an
opportunity to present the actual facts and have the court make a finding
as to whether there is merit to the allegations.
(County’s Respondent’s Brief, p.14.)

Along the same lines, the County continues,

“allegations of this nature can be damaging to the prosecutor’s good name, reputation,
honor[,] and integrity, which also invokes the constitutional right to be heard. [ ]” (County
Respondent’s Brief, p.14 (footnote omitted).)
The error in the County’s logic is it starts from a faulty assumption, that
Ms. Tamara Kelly, the prosecutor in the underlying criminal trial, is a party to this
litigation, thereby creating some sort of life, liberty, or property interest that is at stake in
the instant appeal. See generally Cleveland Bd. Of Educ.v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
542 (1985); see also Idaho Appellate Rule 7.1. Ms. Kelly does not have any “life,
liberty, or property interest” that is in any way affected by Ms. Youmans’ direct appeal.
Regardless of the outcome of this appeal, this Court cannot take any action to deprive
Ms. Kelly of her life, liberty or property interest in this direct appeal. The same is true as
related to Ms. Kelly’s good name as her “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity” is
not “at stake because of what the government is doing to” her.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (emphasis added).
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Wisconsin v.

Further, the County’s argument is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even assuming Ms. Kelly has a liberty interest at stake,
Ms. Youmans has no power to deprive Ms. Kelly of whatever protection the Fourteenth
Amendment provides. Ms. Youmans is a private citizen – she is not the government.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides Ms. Kelly with identified rights and protections
from certain governmental actions – it does not protect her from the actions of nongovernmental actors. See e.g. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Moreover, it
appears as though Ms. Kelly’s concerns are premature: if she eventually faces
contempt of court charges and/or faces disciplinary sanctions from the Idaho State Bar,
she will be provided with notice of the allegations she faces, and an opportunity to rebut
those allegations. See Idaho Criminal Rule 42 (Rule governing contempt proceedings
brought in connection with a criminal proceeding); Idaho Bar Commission Rules § V
(rules governing review of alleged professional misconduct). If she gets fired, disbarred,
or her name is no longer good, it will not be because something listed as a potential
issue in a properly filed Notice of Appeal, rather, it will be because a neutral and
detached district court judge, and/or a bar disciplinary hearing committee, found
Ms. Kelly’s actions to be contemptuous or in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Thus, Ms. Kelly will get all of the due process to which she is entitled under
the Fourteenth Amendment if she faces contempt of court charges and/or faces
disciplinary sanctions from the Idaho State Bar.

9

2.

There Is No Authority That Would Grant The District Court Jurisdiction To
Supplement The Record On Appeal Based Upon The Facts And
Circumstances Of This Case

As is noted above, the AG concedes the district court was without jurisdiction to
make the findings it did in the instant case after Ms. Youmans filed her timely Notice of
Appeal. The County, however, argues both “the applicable statutes and rules provide
otherwise.” Specifically, the County first argues that Idaho Appellate Rule (“I.A.R.”)
13(c)(4) provides such authority:
Subsection 13(c)(4) of the Rule allows a court to “[c]onduct any hearing,
and make any order, decision or judgment allowed or permitted by § 192601, Idaho Code.” Idaho Code 19-2601 explains that the district court
may “suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first
three hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence” and that the court
“retains jurisdiction of the prisoner” during that period.
(County Respondent’s Brief, pp.16-17.) The County then surmises that because the
district court retained jurisdiction over Ms. Youmans it “clearly had jurisdiction” to
supplement the record from the underlying trial. (County Respondent’s Brief, p.17.) In
so arguing, the County relies on an incomplete recitation of the appellate rule and
applicable statute to which it cites.
This Court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Schwartz,
139 Idaho 360, 362 (2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Verska v. Saint
Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 894–96 (2011). “The interpretation of a
statute ‘must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If
the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law
as written.’” Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 (quoting Schwartz, 139 Idaho at 362 (citations
omitted)). If a statute is ambiguous because it is capable of more than one reasonable
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interpretation, then the Court looks to the rules of statutory construction to determine the
legislature’s intent. Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 299–300 (1986) (abrogated in part
on other grounds by Verska, 151 Idaho at 894–96); Bonner City v. Cunningham, 156
Idaho 291, 295 (Ct. App. 2014). “To determine that intent, we examine not only the
literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the
public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history.” Schwartz, 139 Idaho at 362;
see also I.C. § 73-113.
Idaho Appellate Rule 13(c) is titled, “Stay Upon Appeal – Powers of the District
Court – Criminal Actions” and provides:
In criminal actions, unless prohibited by order of the Supreme Court, the
district court shall have the power and authority to rule upon the following
motions and to take the following actions during the pendency of an
appeal[.]
…
(4) Conduct any hearing and make any order, decision or judgment
allowed or permitted by § 19-2601, Idaho Code.”
I.A.R. 13(c)(4) (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 19-2601(4), which addresses the
district court’s ability to retain jurisdiction over a defendant, provides:
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of
guilty, in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against
the laws of the state, except those of treason or murder, the court in its
discretion may:
(4)

Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first
three hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the custody of
the state board of correction. The court shall retain jurisdiction over
the prisoner for a period of up to the first three hundred sixty-five
(365) days. Except as provided for in section 19-2601A, Idaho
Code, during the period of retained jurisdiction, the state board of
correction shall be responsible for determining the placement of the
prisoner and such education, programming and treatment as it
determines to be appropriate. The prisoner will remain committed to
the board of correction if not affirmatively placed on probation by
the court. In extraordinary circumstances, where the court
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concludes that it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant
information within the period of retained jurisdiction, or where the
court concludes that a hearing is required and is unable to obtain
the defendant’s presence for such a hearing within such period, the
court may decide whether to place the defendant on probation or
release jurisdiction within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty
(30) days, after the period of retained jurisdiction has expired.
Placement on probation shall be under such terms and conditions
as the court deems necessary and appropriate. The court in its
discretion may sentence a defendant to more than one (1) period of
retained jurisdiction after a defendant has been placed on probation
in a case or following release from commitment to the department
of juvenile corrections pursuant to section 19-2601A, Idaho Code.
In no case shall the board of correction or its agent, the department
of correction, be required to hold a hearing of any kind with respect
to a recommendation to the court for the grant or denial of
probation. Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the
court. Any recommendation made by the state board of correction
to the court regarding the prisoner shall be in the nature of an
addendum to the presentence report. The board of correction and
its agency, the department of correction, and their employees shall
not be held financially responsible for damages, injunctive or
declaratory relief for any recommendation made to the district court
under this section.
IDAHO CODE § 19-2601(4) (2015) (emphasis added). Contrary to the County’s position,
when read together I.A.R. 13(c)(4) and I.C. § 19-2601(4), only give the district court
authority power and authority to conduct any hearing or making any order, decision, or
judgment as it relates to the 365 day period of retained jurisdiction Ms. Youmans was
serving. Contrarily, the district court in this case held a hearing, heard evidence, and
made findings related to a pretrial issue after Ms. Youmans had been convicted and
judgment had been entered in the case. The district court’s jurisdiction in the instant
case was limited to deciding whether to hold a hearing at the conclusion of
Ms. Youmans’ rider and determining whether she was a suitable candidate for probation
or should remain committed to the Idaho Department of Corrections. See State v.
Taylor, 142 Idaho 30, 31 (2005).

Thus, any finding or order unrelated to the
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determination of whether to place Ms. Youmans on probation or relinquish jurisdiction
was outside the scope of the district court’s permissible authority.
Next, the County argues that I.A.R. 13(c)(10) provides a basis for the district
court’s jurisdiction to have a factual hearing and make findings. Idaho Appellate Rule
13(c)(10) provides that “the district court shall have the power and authority” to “[e]nter
any other order after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant as
authorized by law.” I.A.R. 13(c)(10). Relying on State v. Wade4 and State v. Wilson5
the County argues that I.A.R. 13(c)(10) is a “catch-all” provision “couched in ‘broad
language’” that provides the district court with authority go back and make a “complete
and accurate record” of issues arising in a case long after the judgment has been
entered. (County Respondent’s Brief, pp.19.) Effectively, the County is advocating that
I.A.R. 13(c)(10) gives a district court authority to supplement the district court record in
every case to make a “complete and accurate record” as necessary to reach a “just
outcome.” (County Respondent’s Brief, pp.19-20.) The County is mistaken.
In Wade, the Court of Appeals was clear to hold that “I.A.R. 13(c)(10) was
intended was intended to give the district court jurisdiction to rule upon a motion that
has been inadvertently overlooked or that was pending, but not yet decided, when the
notice of appeal was filed.” 125 Idaho at 524. However, the Wade Court cautioned,
“after an appeal is filed, a district court in a criminal proceeding may enter an order on a
motion filed prior to the appeal where such ruling merely completes the record and does
not in any way alter an order or judgment from which the appeal has been taken.” Id.

4
5

State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522 (Ct. App. 1994).
State v. Wilson, 136 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 2001).
13

(emphsis added).)

The actions taken by the district court in this case, were not

necessary to rule upon an overlooked motion or a motion that had been filed
immediately prior to the notice of appeal and did in fact alter the judgment from which
the appeal was taken.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals Opinion in Wilson does not support the County’s
position. In Wilson, the defendant pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance, filed
a timely notice of appeal, and then filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea one day
after filing the notice of appeal. 136 Idaho at 772. The district court concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id.
The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the district court did have jurisdiction to
entertain the motion to withdraw the guilty plea because it is a motion “’authorized by
law’ and because an order on such a motion affects ‘the substantial rights of the
defendant.’” Id. at 773. Here, the district court was not acting on a motion “authorized
by law,” but rather a request by the County to reopen a case to made additional factual
findings. Moreover, the district court did not enter any additional order and it certainly
action was necessary to affect “the substantial rights of the defendant.” Id.
Most recently, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed an issues substantially
similar to the argument the County now raises on appeal. See State v. Lemmons, 158
Idaho 971 (2015). In Lemmons, following his convictions for two counts of trafficking in
methamphetamine by delivering methamphetamine and trafficking in methamphetamine
by conspiring to deliver methamphetamine, Lemmons filed a motion for judgment of
acquittal . 158 Idaho at 973. The district court entered an order denying the motion for
judgment of acquittal, but granted a motion for a new trial. Id. The State filed a notice
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of appeal. Id. at 974. The day after the State filed a notice of appeal, Lemmons filed a
motion for reconsideration asking the district court to grant the acquittal rather than the
new trial, which was granted by the district court. Id.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court’s order granting
Lemmons motion to reconsider was void “because the district court did not have
jurisdiction to enter the order.” Id. The Court observed that upon the filing of the notice
of appeal, “the district court ‘lost jurisdiction over the entire action except as provided in
Rule 13 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.’” Id (citing Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799,
804 (2010)). The Court then observed that I.A.R. 13 “does not permit a court to grant a
motion for reconsideration or a motion for acquittal.” Id. Accordingly, just as a motion to
reconsideration is not permissible under I.A.R. 13, so too is the Motion to Supplement
the Record filed by the County in the instant case and as a result, the district court was
without jurisdiction to entertain it.
If, as the County asserts, a district court is permitted to reopen a case, hear
additional factual evidence, and make new factual findings to ensure a “complete and
adequate record’ as necessary for a “just outcome,” it is not only prosecutors that would
be entitled to those procedures. Rather, defendants would be entitled to reopen their
cases after the filing of a notice of appeal and district courts would be required to hold
hearings, hear additional evidence, and make new factual findings on those issues that
were not adequately or completely litigated. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 476
(1973). Thus, many, if not most claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could be
litigated on direct appeal whereby appellate counsel would be able to identify motions
that should have been filed, or objections that could have been made and obtain
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supplemental factual determinations in the district court. Thereafter, with a “complete
and accurate record,” those issues, which otherwise would have to be raised in postconviction, could now be raised on direct appeal. If the County is correct, it may impose
upon appellate counsel an ethical duty to review the record and transcripts to identify
claims that were incorrectly preserved or should have been raised, and move to stay the
appeal pending an offer of additional evidence and new factual findings to insure a
“complete and accurate record.”
Accordingly, the district court was without jurisdiction to make the additional
findings in the instant case after Ms. Youmans filed her timely Notice of Appeal.
Assuming arguendo, that the County is correct a district court has jurisdiction to
entertain additional evidence and make new factual findings to insure a “just outcome,”
that procedural right should be reciprocal and apply equally to criminal defendants
whose liberty interests are truly at stake and are entitled to the same procedural
protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. See Wardius, 412 U.S. at 476.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Youmans respectfully requests that this Court vacate her convictions for
burglary, attempted burglary, and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance.
Alternatively, Ms. Youmans requests that this Court vacate her sentences and remand
the case to the district court with instructions that it withhold judgment over her.
Alternatively, Ms. Youmans requests that this Court reduce her sentences as it deems
appropriate. Additionally, Ms. Youmans requests that this Court strike all filing by the
State, any additional evidence offered, and all findings by the district court related to the
potential claim that the State withheld the computer hard drive in this case and/or
denied her defense counsel access to the same.
DATED this 4th day of August, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Interim State Appellate Public Defender
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